The strait’s clearest cost to Pakistan is physical: Qatari LNG cannot leave the Gulf, and Qatar supplied 99% of Pakistan’s LNG imports in 2025. For crude oil, the closure works mainly through price and freight, because UAE and Saudi cargoes can load outside the strait. Pakistan’s exports to the GCC were Inflation and bond-market stress owe as much to the wider war and to domestic policy as to the closure; this is the author’s reading of the evidence below.
Why separate the strait from the war
Since the US and Israel struck Iran on February 28, the Strait of Hormuz has been largely blocked or disrupted for more than seven months. On October 4, Iran said it would stay closed until the US meets its conditions. Before the war, it carried about 20.9 million barrels of oil a day, roughly a quarter of seaborne oil trade, plus over 20% of LNG trade. Reuters reported that about 90% of Pakistan’s oil and LNG imports passed through it before the war.
But the war has also damaged energy facilities, raised risk premiums and forced Pakistani policy decisions. Blaming all that on Hormuz gets the analysis wrong. The diagram below shows how this article sorts an effect into three groups: closure, other war effects and domestic policy.
| Ask this question | If yes → classify as | If no → |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Would the effect disappear if ships could pass freely? | CLOSURE EFFECTExamples: idle Qatari LNG, higher freight costs, war-risk cover | Go to Question 2 |
| 2. Is the effect caused by attacks, physical damage, or war risk? | OTHER WAR EFFECTExamples: damaged Ras Laffan trains, Red Sea threats | Go to Question 3 |
| 3. Is the effect caused by a Pakistani policy decision? | DOMESTIC POLICYExamples: fuel levies, relief schemes, austerity | If no: NOT CAUSED BY THE WAR |
THE RULE OF THUMB
| CLOSUREWould normal shipping remove it? | WARIs it due to conflict, damage or risk? | POLICY / OTHERIs it a domestic decision—or unrelated? |
| Date (2026) | Event |
|---|---|
| 28 Feb | US and Israeli strikes begin; strait disrupted |
| 6 Mar | Petrol raised by Rs55 to Rs321.17 a litre |
| 3 Apr | Petrol peaks at Rs458.41 a litre |
| 8 Apr | Two-week ceasefire; Iran promises safe passage; Brent falls about 16% to roughly $91 |
| 13 Apr | US counter-blockade of ships heading to Iranian ports |
| May | IMF Board completes the third review; baseline impact contained, downside risks high |
| July | Interim truce breaks down; Pakistan’s Gulf shipping is hit again |
| 30 Jul | Pakistan removed from war-risk Lloyd’s Joint War Committee listed areas |
| 26 Sep | Trump rejects an Iranian proposal to reopen the strait |
| 4 Oct | Iran says the strait stays closed until the US meets its conditions |
LNG: the clearest closure effect
Pakistan’s gas supply is concentrated. Qatar provided 99.03% of its LNG imports in 2025, worth about $2.93 billion; Kpler puts Qatar and the UAE together at 99%. 7.5 of the 8.4 million tonnes a year in Pakistan’s term contracts are Qatari, and Qatar’s LNG has no practical sea route that avoids the strait.
The consequences have been physical. Imports fell 68% in March from February, while India’s and Bangladesh’s rose. Coal rose to about 30% of the power mix, planned blackouts followed and two fertilizer plants shut. Pakistan’s LNG import bill for FY2025-26 fell 36.1% to $2.22 billion, because it bought less gas, not because gas got cheaper: a mid-July spot cargo cost $21.88 per MMBtu, against $12 to $13 a year earlier.
How the closure reached Pakistan’s LNG users
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Power sectorCoal rises to about 30% of the mix; planned blackouts
|
IndustryTwo fertilizer plants shut
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Sources: CSIS; ISSI; Trade Bottlenecks database (2025 import data).
How much is the closure and how much is war damage? Qatar’s own figures imply a split between what returns after reopening and what does not. QatarEnergy’s CEO says the company is producing very little LNG and that it can resume normal operations within weeks of reopening, except for two damaged trains, about 17% of capacity (12.8 million tonnes a year), that need about three years of repairs. Rystad Energy’s March assessment names the same trains and puts repairs at up to five years, and a Rystad analyst later expected full available output within months of a complete reopening, not weeks.
Because Qatar is producing very little LNG at present, today’s halt is essentially the closure; the damage determines how much will not come back. Taking Qatar’s statement at face value, about 83% of its capacity could return once the strait reopens and 17% could not for years. That split is an inference from company statements and is untested because the strait has not reopened; it also describes Qatar’s national capacity, not Pakistan’s shortfall. The first stoppage in early March followed Iranian drone strikes on Qatari facilities, so March mixes both causes.
| Blocked by the strait 83% | Damaged 17% |
QatarEnergy via Oil & Gas Journal; Rystad Energy via Anadolu · 83% derived as 100% minus 17% (Qatar’s conditional estimate, untested)
Crude oil: mainly a price and freight story
“Gulf-sourced” is not the same as “passing through Hormuz.” In 2025, the UAE supplied 51.85% and Saudi Arabia 47.46% of Pakistan’s crude imports. UAE crude loads at Fujairah, outside the strait, and Pakistani refiners kept receiving it; Saudi crude from Yanbu on the Red Sea is also outside the strait, but Houthi threats to the Bab el-Mandeb route made it uncertain. Bypass capacity is limited: the IEA estimated 3.5 to 5.5 million barrels a day across the region, and on April 8, a report said Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline was targeted in an attack.
The routing of refined products is not clear from public data, which is why the Reuters estimate of 90% for oil and LNG together cannot be split by product.
On volumes, supply appears to have continued. Refiners leaned on UAE cargoes via Fujairah, state tankers brought petrol from Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and the largest refiner bought 8.1 million barrels of US crude over nine months. FY2025-26 crude imports rose 31.58% to $7.17 billion, but that year includes only four months of war.
The direct oil effect is therefore mainly price. Brent closed at $109.27 on 7 April, then fell about 16% to roughly $91 when the ceasefire promised safe passage. Reuters called the war’s first month the steepest monthly oil price rise in history, above 50%.
Pump prices add domestic policy. Petrol rose Rs55 to Rs321.17 on 6 March, peaked at Rs458.41 on 3 April and fell to Rs378.41 the next day, and was Rs396.65 on 8 October. The pump price is the world price plus Pakistan’s tax decisions, so it is not a pure measure of the closure.
Trade and shipping: smaller losses, one unexpected gain
Pakistan routes about 80% of its GCC trade through Jebel Ali, and shipping lines suspended Pakistan-GCC services in March. The Commerce Ministry reported GCC exports 2.2% lower in July-April and warned of a further fall of about $600 million over three to six months if conditions did not improve. Its figure of more than $1.4 billion for trade and transit losses also includes the Afghan border closure, so it cannot be attributed to Hormuz.
The data show a smaller hit than feared. PIDE warned in March that GCC exports could fall by $1.5 to $2 billion if the closure persisted. Exports to the GCC in January-July were $1.944 billion, 2.1% higher than a year earlier, and July fell 12% after the truce broke down. Another report put March’s fall at nearly 70%, probably on a different basis; PBS data would settle it.
Costs rose, and one effect was positive. War-risk premiums for strait transits rose from about 0.25% of hull value before the war to as high as 10% at the peak. Karachi port reportedly handled 8,860 transshipment containers in 24 days, against 8,300 in all of 2025. Pakistan was also removed from the Lloyd’s war-risk listed areas on 30 July, but that reflects its own risk rating after negotiations that began in March, not the strait’s status.
What is not the closure
- IMF baseline. The IMF expects the war to push up inflation and weigh on growth and the balance of payments, with an overall impact it calls contained and downside risks it calls high.
- Market risk. Credit default swap spreads rose from 344 to 577 basis points early in the war. That is a general war-risk premium, not a measure of the strait.
- Inflation. Headline inflation was 9.2% in July and 11.1% in August. The SBP had already expected inflation to rise above its target range late in FY2025-26 because of low base effects, so not all of it comes from the war.
- Remittances. Inflows rose 14% to $10.88 billion in July-September.
- External account. The FY2025-26 current account deficit was $139 million, with record remittances partly offsetting a wider trade deficit, and reserves were above $21 billion by September.
| Channel | Closure effect | Other war or policy effect | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| LNG | Up to about 83% of Qatari capacity (Qatar’s estimate of what returns on reopening); imports down 68% in March | 17% damaged; early-March drone halt | Strong |
| Crude and products | World price, freight and insurance; cargoes rerouted | Houthi threat to the Red Sea route; fuel levy decisions | Medium |
| Trade | Gulf shipping suspended; GCC exports fell after March | Afghan border closure inside the losses figure | Medium |
| Finance | Indirect | Spreads, outflows, health of Gulf economies | Weak to medium |
Forecast versus outcome
| Forecast | Source | What the data show so far |
|---|---|---|
| Oil adds $4.5 billion to the import bill; GCC exports fall $1.5 to $2 billion if the closure persists | PIDE, 26 March | FY2025-26 petroleum bill $16.86 billion, with LNG down 36.1%; January-July GCC exports up 2.1% |
| Inflation rises from 7.1% to 11.1% if oil goes from $80 to $160 | PIDE scenario | Headline inflation 11.1% in August; the scenario assumed $160 oil |
| Reserves fall to $6.8 billion by end-2026 if imports and remittances do not adjust; oil averages $113 in Q2 | Oxford Economics | SBP reserves above $21 billion in September; remittances up 14% |
Oxford Economics said Pakistan would likely manage through moderate import compression while Gulf remittances held up. Its $6.8 billion figure was therefore a warning about what would happen without adjustment, not a forecast of what did happen.
The comparison with neighbours points the same way. India and Bangladesh faced the same closed strait but imported more LNG in March, and India awarded 41 (one-off purchases of individual LNG cargoes through a competitive tender, as opposed to cargoes delivered under long-term contracts) and Bangladesh 32, against 6 for Pakistan. That gap is Pakistan-specific exposure, meaning contract concentration, price sensitivity and limited credit, not the closure itself.
Precedent, and what is different
Earlier Gulf crises, most notably in 1990, raised oil bills and disrupted worker remittances, with other Gulf states eventually offsetting some of the damage. A 1993 Oxford Institute for Energy Studies study of that crisis separates price, volume and structure effects on import bills, which makes it a useful method reference. But 1990 was mainly a price shock. The 2026 closure is a prolonged physical blockage, so volume effects, especially on LNG, matter more.
Limits of this analysis
There is no official SBP or IMF decomposition of the closure’s effect on Pakistan, so the framework above is an analytical judgement built on public sources. The 90% route figure is a news-agency statement without a stated source, and Qatar’s capacity figures are company statements.
Petrol prices are compiled from press reports with OGRA notifications as the primary source. Trade and freight figures from industry bodies are claims, not audited data. The strait remains closed, so every figure here is provisional. Reopening would restore most Qatari LNG within weeks, but not all of it, and would not by itself reverse the wider war effects on risk premiums and Gulf economies.
References
Trade Bottlenecks database, Wrocław University of Economics and Business. Pakistan country matrix, 2025 import data.
Pakistan Institute of Development Economics. “The Middle East Crisis Impact on Pakistan’s Trade.” Policy Viewpoint No. 56, 26 March 2026.
House of Commons Library. “Israel/US-Iran Conflict 2026: Reopening the Strait of Hormuz.” Research Briefing CBP-10636.
Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad. “The 2026 Hormuz Crisis and Pakistan’s Energy Security.” Issue Brief, 8 October 2026.
International Monetary Fund. Pakistan: Third Review Under the Extended Fund Facility and Second Review Under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility. Country Report No. 26/101, May 2026.
Center for Strategic and International Studies. “Pakistan’s LNG Imports Under Pressure: Impacts of the Strait of Hormuz’s Closure and Pakistan’s Diplomatic Response.”
International Energy Agency. Strait of Hormuz Factsheet. February 2026.
State Bank of Pakistan. Monetary Policy Statements: 14 September 2026, 27 July 2026, and December 2025.
Khan, Sarah Ahmad. “Oil Price Shocks and Developing Countries: A Case Study of the Gulf Crisis.” Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 1993.
Economic Research Analyst and an MS Economics student at LUMS, with a Bachelor's in Economics from IBA Karachi.




